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Abstract
Personal  data   is   increasingly  conceived  as  a   tradable  asset.  Markets   for
personal   information   are   emerging   and   new   ways   of   valuating
individuals’  data  are  being  proposed.  At  the  same  time,  legal  obligations
over   protection   of   personal   data   and   individuals’   concerns   over   its
privacy   persist.   This   article   outlines   some   of   the   economic,   technical,
social,  and  ethical  issues  associated  with  personal  data  markets,  focusing













Why personal data markets matter
Personal  data  is  the  new  oil  of  the  Internet  and  the  currency
of  the  digital  world.
In  2009,  Meglena  Kuneva,  speaking  as  European  Commissioner  for
Consumer  Protection,  compared  personal  data  to  oil,  in  order  to  illustrate
how  information  pertaining  to  individuals  had  become  a  crucial  asset  in  the
digital  economy.  Every  day,  individuals  around  the  world  send  or  receive
196  billion  e-­mails  (Radicati   2014 ),  submit  over  500  million  tweets  on
Twitter  (Internet  Life  Stats   2014 ),  and  share  4.75  billion  pieces  of  content
on  Facebook  (Noyes   2014 ).  A  report  by  the  Boston  Consulting  Group
(2012 )  projects  that  the  sectors  leveraging  personal  data  will  leap  ahead  of
the  rest  of  the  economy  and  produce  €1  trillion  in  corporate  profits  in
Europe  by  2020.
The  World  Economic  Forum  (2011 ,   2012 )  has  described  personal  data  as
a  new  asset  class,  and  a  complex  ecosystem  of  entities  collecting,
analyzing,  and  trading  personal  information  (companies  such  as  Blue
KaiBlueKai,  Avarto,  Rapleaf,  AcurintAccurint,  and  Merlin)  has  emerged.
Personal  data  is  seen  as  a  new  asset  because  of  its  potential  for  creating
added  value  for  companies  and  consumers,  and  for  its  ability  to  enable
services  hardly  imaginable  without  it.  Companies  use  personal  data  for  a
variety  of  purposes:  reduce  search  costs  for  products  via  personalized  and
collaborative  filtering  of  offerings;;  lower  transaction  costs  for  themselves
and  for  consumers;;  conduct  risk  analysis  on  customers;;  and  increase
advertising  returns  through  better  targeting  of  advertisements.  Personal
data  can  also  be  a  product  in  itself,  when  it  is  entangled  with  user-­
generated  content,  as  in  the  case  of  social  media.  Personal  data  can  also
become  strategic  capital  that  allows  businesses  to  derive  superior  market
intelligence  or  improve  existing  operations.  This  can  materialize  in  better
or  new  forms  of  product  development  (for  instance,  mass  customization:
Henkel  and  von  Hippel   2005 )  as  well  as  price  discrimination  (Acquisti  and
Varian   2005 ).  Businesses  can  also  build  competitive  advantage  or  create
market  entry  barriers  by  using  personal  information  to  lock  customers  in
(Shapiro  and  Varian   1998 ).
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At  the  same  time,  personal  data  can  become  a  burden  for  organizations  as
much  as  an  asset.  One  of  the  most  salient  liabilities  of  holding  personal
data  arises  from  the  legal  uncertainty  surrounding  its  management.  Privacy
regulation,  which  comprises  the  protection  of  personal  data,  is  an  evolving
and  among  the  least  globally  harmonized  fields  of  law.  Different  countries
in  the  world  use  different  definitions  of  personal  data  and  apply  different
rules  governing  its  collection  and  use.  As  a  result,  businesses  operating  in
a  digital  economy  without  borders  are  exposed  to  legal  and  enforcement
risks  (Romanosky  et  al.   2012 )  that  are  hard  to  quantify.  Other  liabilities
arise  from  the  risk  that  large  collections  of  personal  data  become  targets  of
cybercrime,  in  particular  when  they  include  identifying  or  financial
information.  To  mitigate  this  threat,  companies  must  exert  constant  effort,
adjusting  protection  technology  and  organizational  processes  to  protect
information  assets  and  secure  data  exchanges.  But  even  when  they  do  so,  a
state  of  zero  risk  remains  unachievable.  Organizations  that  strive  for
compliance  can  still  fall  victim  to  data  breaches,  which  in  most
jurisdictions  entail  costly  breach  notifications  that  damage  a  firm’s
reputation  and  market  value  (Acquisti  et  al.   2006 ).  The  extent  of  ex  post
loss  incurred  through  such  breaches  is  hardly  foreseeable.  Its  extent  could
be  huge,  and  yet  not  fully  traceable.  For  example,  the  damage  caused  by
the  data  breach  incident  in  Sony’s  PlayStation  Network  in  2011  was
estimated  alternatively  at  €128  million,  and  at  €3.5  billion.   A  major
reason  for  the  unpredictability  of  losses  is  the  unforeseeable  shift  in  public
opinion’s  responses  to  personal  data  breaches.  Public  opinion  can  turn
against  a  firm  considered  responsible  for  its  breach,  damaging  its  brand  or
even  a  whole  industry.  Breaches  can  trigger  rash  government  intervention.
But  they  can  also  go  largely  unnoticed.  Adding  to  this  tension  is,  since  the
Snowden  revelations,  the  deep  conflict  between  law  enforcers’  desire  to
tap  personal  data  and  a  sensitized  media  to  this  issue.
Against  the  background  of  these  market  promises  as  well  as  economic,
social  and  political  risks,  we  aim  to  offer  an  academic  perspective  on
personal  data  markets.  We  discuss  where  these  markets  stand,  legally,
technically  and  ethically,  and  highlight  the  major  questions  that  market
players  and  policy  makers  will  arguably  need  to  face  in  handling  those
markets.




Researchers  anticipated  personal  data  markets  since  the  early  1990s
(Laudon  1996 ).  When  the  idea  was  first  proposed,  by  and  large  themany
members  of  the  academic  legal  community  reacted  cautiously  to  it,  under
the  argument  that  people’s  privacy  concerns  and  their  legal  right  to  privacy
would  challenge  the  treatment  of  personal  data  as  an  asset  class  (Acquisti
and  Varian   2005 ).  To  many  academics,  it  seemed  as  if  the  ethical  right  to
privacy  would  be  antithetical  to  the  very  idea  of  markets  for  personal  data
(Samuelson  2000 ).
While  many  still  consider  privacy  an  inalienable  human  right,  and  while
privacy-­enhancing  technologies  have  been  designed  to  protect  it,  data
markets  have  developed  in  the  opposite  direction.  Due  to  Internet  users’
apparent  comfort  with  sharing  their  data,  more  and  more  organizations
today  engage  in  the  trading  of  consumer  data,  operating  in  legal  grey  zones
when  it  comes  to  handling  personal  information  assets.
Discussions  around  more  legitimate  personal  data  markets  have  recently
emerged,  pushed  by  influential  global  actors  like  the  World  Economic
Forum.  In  the  US  and  in  Europe,  it  is  now  intensively  discussed  whether
personal  data  could  be  seen  as  “property”  (Schwartz   2004 ;;  Purtova   2012 ;;
Spiekermann  and  Novotny  2015 ).  The  OECD  and  scholars  around  the
world  have  started  to  think  about  how  personal  information  could  be  priced
(OECD  2013 ;;  Acquisti   2010 ,   2014 ;;  Spiekermann  et  al.   2012 ).  Thought
leaders  have  proposed  whole  new  market  structures  and  business  models
that  may  allow  consumers  to  get  into  the  driver’s  seat  for  their  personal
data  (Searls   2012 ;;  Hamlin   2013 ).  Established  software  vendors  envision
the  technical  architecture  that  would  be  needed  to  do  so.  And  start-­ups
such  as  Qiy,  Connect  or  Gigya  go  ahead  and  propose  tools  and  services
that  they  believe  make  it  happen.
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Against  these  developments  towards  personal  data  markets,  however,  also
economic,  legal,  technical  and  social  challenges  have  emerged.  We  discuss
some  of  those  challenges  in  the  rest  of  this  section.
Intertwined legal and economic challenges
In  many  countries,  the  use  of  personal  data  is  highly  regulated,  as  is  the
data  exchange  between  jurisdictions.  Most  often,  a  set  of  data  protection
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principles  that  inform  privacy  laws  include  rights  and  obligations  such  as
data  minimization,  legitimate  use,  purpose  binding,  and  informed  consent
(see,  for  instance,  the  OECD  Privacy  Guidelines).  These  principles  leave
little  room  for  market  negotiations  between  the  data  subject  and  the  data
controller,  let  alone  between  third  parties.  Thus,  personal  data  markets
must  deal  with  these  constraints  or  operate  in  grey  areas—as  many
currently  do.  For  example,  some  firms  use  enforcement  gaps  or  regulatory
arbitrage  between  jurisdictions  to  engage  in  the  trade  of  personal  data.  As  a
result,  aside  from  special  and  tightly  regulated  ventures  (such  as  address
brokerage  for  direct  marketing,  credit  reporting,  government  health
insurance,  or  pollster  panels),  most  of  personal  data  gathered  today  online
seems  to  remain  a  rather  inconvenient  unit  of  account.
If  that  was  to  change,  and  a  true  kind  of  “currency”  or  monetary  value
were  to  be  sought  for  personal  data,  then  we  would  need  to  deal  with  the
fact  that  data  has—in  many  respects—the  traits  of  a  free  commons.  By  its
nature,  personal  data  is  non-­rival,  cheap  to  produce,  cheap  to  copy,  and
cheap  to  transmit.  It  is  substantially  different  from  typical  commodities,
such  as  oil.  Hence,  markets  for  personal  data  would  need  to  rely  on  legal
frameworks  that  establish  alienability,  rivalry,  and  excludability  for
personal  data,  and  assign  initial  ownership  to  an  entity  such  as  the  data
subject.  To  enforce  asset  rights,  the  right  institutions,  sanctions,  and—most
importantly—technology  must  interact  seamlessly.
The  possible  economic  consequences  of  a  property  right  regime  for
personal  data  may  include  scarcity  of  personal  information  and
competition  in  its  use.  Data  controllers  with  data-­intensive  business  models
may  need  to  adequately  compensate  data  subjects,  whereas  business
models  no  longer  profitable  when  personal  data  is  costly  may  vanish  or
pursue  other  sources  of  revenue,  such  as  service  fees.  Will  market  forces
thus  lead  to  “data  rationalization,”  a  kind  of  profit-­motivated  data
avoidance?  To  answer  this  question,  one  would  need  to  study  the  shifts  in
market  structure  and  the  industrial  organization  of  the  affected  sectors
(Goldfarb  and  Tucker   2011 ).  If  corporate  information  systems  need
upgrades  to  support  enforcement  of  property  rights,  businesses,  hardware
supply  chains,  software  development,  and  vendors  will  be  affected.  An
economy’s  potential  to  innovate  may  be  affected  as  well.
Another  economic  challenge  associated  with  personal  data  markets  relates
20.4.2015 e.Proofing
http://eproofing.springer.com/journals/printpage.php?token=hhy8suqZZz4fePqFqhWi6HvoXQCS-GQZpOPazC5DflE 6/19
to  how  to  value  personal  information.  Due  to  context-­dependence  and
contingencies  that  affect  the  costs  and  benefits  arising  from  the  protection
or  the  sharing  of  personal  information,  evaluating  personal  data  is
notoriously  difficult  (Berthold  and  Böhme  2009 ).  Numerous  experimental
economic  studies  have  attempted  to  capture  price  tags  for  personal  data
items  (Grossklags  and  Acquisti   2007 ;;  Lesk   2012 ;;  Jentzsch  et  al.   2012 ),
but  it  is  hard  to  map  these  data  points  into  a  consistent  picture,  due  to
heuristics  and  biases  which  may  significantly  affect  individuals  privacy
choices,  including  in  fact  their  valuations  of  their  personal  data  (Acquisti
2004 ;;  Acquisti  et  al.   2013 ).  This  task  becomes  even  more  difficult  if  one
tries  to  crosscheck  against  prices  in  advertising  (NA  2013 )  or  credit
markets  (Böhme  and  Pötzsch   2010 ).
The  difficulty  of  measuring  the  value  of  data  raises  many  questions  about
price  discovery  in  personal  data  markets.  How  can  buyers  and  sellers
negotiate  in  a  setting  where  information  is  inherently  asymmetric?  What
market  mechanism  can  determine  the  right  price  under  the  constraint  of
minimal  information  leakage?  How  should  buyers  and  sellers  do  the
accounting  for  their  trades?  And  how  can  auditors  detect  fraud  or  bust
cartels?  On  the  fiscal  side,  how  should  data  trading  or  income  from  the  sale
of  personal  data  be  taxed?  On  a  macroeconomic  level,  how  will  personal
data  trade  affect  gross  value  added  and  the  balance  of  payments?
Obviously,  the  answer  to  these  questions  is  not  independent  of  technology.
For  example,  noisy,  pseudonymous,  or  anonymous  data  may  be  less
valuable  than  fully  identifiable  records,  but  by  how  much?  And  will  the
difference  match  the  data  subject’s  preference  for  being  less  identifiable?
Even  if  stable  prices  for  personal  data  were  found  and  personal  data
markets  were  liquid,  there  would  be  no  guarantee  that  prices  will  reflect
any  “intrinsic”  value  of  data.  History  is  full  of  periods  of  mispricing,  some
of  them  lasting  decades,  in  virtually  all  asset  markets;;  why  should  personal
data  markets  be  exempt?  But  then,  how  can  we  proactively  avoid
speculative  bubbles,  and  how  can  we  ensure  that  personal  data  markets  will
not  detach  from  the  real  lives  of  people?
Beyond  value  and  price,  a  more  general  concern  is  how  the  mere  existence
of  personal  data  markets  may  affect  society.  Consider,  for  instance,
strategic  data  subjects  who  maximize  the  value  of  their  personal  data  and
therefore  engage  in  strategic  behavior,  such  as  avoiding  leaving  traces  that
link  them  to  people  from  troubled  neighborhoods.  How  does  this  affect
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social  cohesion,  equality  of  opportunity,  freedom,  and  democracy?
Furthermore,  future  uses  of  data  should  be  anticipated  and  accounted  for  in
the  pricing  mechanism  in  order  to  attain  fair  valuations  of  personal  data.
This,  however,  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  achieve  for  information  shared
online  and  in  particular  via  online  social  networks,  where  users  often
cross-­post  information  about  others  and  so  impose  privacy  externalities  on
each  other  (Tufekci   2008 ;;  Biczok  and  Chia  2013;;  Cao  et  al.   2014 ).  The
challenge  is  how  to  internalize  such  privacy  externalities  so  that  the  data
subject  can  be  fairly  compensated.  The  standard  solution  is  to  facilitate
bargaining  among  the  data  subjects  and  data  controllers  (Coase   1960 ),  but
this  goal  may  prove  nearly  impossible  to  attain  when  the  community  has
millions  of  users.  The  other  solution  is  to  restrict  the  sharing  and  use  of
personal  data,  but  such  policy  can  distort  service  quality  and  social  welfare
(Cao  et  al.   2014 ).
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Finally,  if  personal  data  becomes  property,  important  legal  challenges  will
include  tailoring  property  rights  so  that  they  are  compatible  with  the  notion
of  privacy  as  a  fundamental  right,  defining  the  initial  allocation  of  property
rights,  balancing  sanctions,  and  seeking  international  coordination.
Tailoring  rights  means  restricting  alienability  and  exclusivity.  For
example,  people  should  always  retain  the  right  to  use  their  personal  data  in
private  contexts,  and  the  government  should  have  free  access  to  one’s  date
of  birth  for  purposes  such  as  identification.  Defining  the  initial  allocation
is  difficult  when  a  data  item  concerns  the  relation  between  multiple  data
subjects,  such  as  links  in  a  social  graph.  Sanctions  must  be  enforceable  and
technology-­neutral.  Specific  to  personal  data  is  the  problem  of  false
information  and  the  risk  of  false  accusation,  which  bound  the  toughness  of
sanctions.  Given  that  it  took  decades  to  negotiate  trade  agreements  for
(selected)  tangible  goods  or  to  find  a  common  understanding  on
intellectual  property  rights,  the  size  of  the  challenge  to  harmonize  property
rights  for  personal  data  is  hard  to  gauge.
Technical challenges
Arguably,  the  only  way  to  enforce  property  rights  for  personal  data  would
be  by  mandating  technology  that  “reverses”  the  laws  of  information  goods.
Scholars  have  pointed  out  that  this  endeavor  has  parallels  with  digital
rights  management  (DRM),  which  protects  media  content  (Kenny  and
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Korba   2002 ),  but  companies  are  still  reluctant  to  adopt  this  technology  for
privacy,  mainly  due  to  an  overt  lack  of  incentives  (Böhme  and  Koble
2007 ).
Solutions  originally  developed  as  privacy-­enhancing  technology  may  be
applied  to  personal  data  markets.  Methods  invented  for  the  privacy
principle  of  data  minimization  may  for  instance  be  employed  in  systems  to
enforce  fine-­granular  data  access  rights.  These  rights  could  be  encoded  in
new  formal  languages,  drawing  on  languages  specified  for  privacy
policies,  such  as  P3P  (Cranor   2002 )  and  EPAL  (Schunter  and  Powers
2003 ),  and  attached  to  data  as  sticky  policies  (Pearson  and  Mont   2011 ).
For  example,  cryptographic  zero-­knowledge  proofs,  running  on  top  of  an
anonymous  communications  layer,  can  help  to  exchange  only  the  necessary
information  with  a  transaction  partner  (Chaum  1985 ).  The  effectiveness  of
two  anonymous  credential  systems,  IBM’s  Idemix  and  Microsoft’s  U-­
Prove,  has  been  demonstrated  in  pilot  studies  (ABC4Trust,  PrimeLife).
Fully  homomorphic  encryption  is  on  the  horizon  (Gentry   2010 ),  but  it  is
still  too  inefficient  for  bulk  processing  of  personal  data.  As  a  result,  an
existing  challenge  is  that  cryptographic  protocols  require  all  transaction
details  to  be  known  at  the  time  of  invocation.  This  requirement  is  contrary
to  the  needs  of  personal  data  markets.  Many  features  that  make  personal
data  particularly  valuable  require  flexibility  during  a  transaction  or
completely  dissolve  the  association  between  data  and  transaction.  For
example,  it  could  be  argued  that  data  stimulates  innovation  when  it  is
shared  without  knowing  in  advance  what  others  will  figure  out  to  do  with
it.
A  promising  workaround  is  to  relax  the  trust  assumption:  instead  of  using
cryptography  to  secure  the  data  itself,  cryptography  could  secure  the
integrity  of  a  trusted  computing  platform  and  trusted  software,  which  runs
conventional  algorithms  on  unencrypted  data.  This  usage  control  paradigm
—as  opposed  to  access  control—trades  technical  complexity  for  new
organizational  challenges  including  institutional  trust  relationships,  supply
chain  security,  interfaces  and  processes  for  effective  audits,  and  sanctions
to  deter  abuse  (Sackmann  et  al.   2006 ).  Systems  enabling  a  flow  control  for
accountable  information  would  have  to  be  designed,  implemented,  tested,
and  standardized  along  with  the  underlying  data  models,  audit  processes,
and  controls.  Quality  metrics  could  adapt  existing  paradigms  for  privacy
metrics,  such  as  k-­anonymity  for  database  privacy  (Sweeney  2002 ),
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effectiveness  of  data  perturbation  approaches  (Menon  et  al.   2005 ;;  Li  and
Sarkar   2006 ),  information-­theoretic  metrics  of  data  leakage,  or
randomization-­based  proof  techniques  inspired  by  differential  privacy
(Dwork  2011 ).
Such  a  transformation  of  enterprise  systems  would  need  to  go  along  with
novel  end  user  devices.  Here,  one  can  envisage  interfaces  that  empower
individuals  to  manage  their  personal  data  (Zwick  and  Dholakia   2004 ),
ideally  on  their  own  trusted  devices;;  this  practice  would  establish  a  strong
base  for  the  user’s  digital  identity.  Much  has  been  proposed  in  this  realm
(e.g.,  Hansen  et  al.   2004 ).  Personal  data  markets  may,  perhaps,  create  the
right  incentives  to  push  adoption  of  such  solutions  above  critical  mass.
Furthermore,  substantial  human  factor  research  has  improved  our
understanding  of  when  and  why  users  make  privacy  compromises,
intentionally  or  accidentally.  This  research  can  feed  into  insight  on  how  to
build  interfaces  that  make  personal  data  markets  usable  for  ordinary
people.
Social and ethical challenges
Interpreting  personal  data  as  a  tradable  good  raises  ethical  concerns  about
whether  people’s  lives,  materialized  in  their  data  traces,  should  be  property
at  all,  or  whether  in  fact  personal  data  should  be  considered  inalienable
from  data  subjects.  The  “propertization  of  the  human  being”  touches  upon
fundamental  discourses  in  philosophy,  sociology,  and  political  sciences
about  what  is  private  and  public,  what  constitutes  identity  and  what  it  takes
to  be  a  responsible  (in  German:  “mündiger”)  citizen  with  sufficient  liberty
to  form  preferences  and  opinions  by  him  or  herself.  Disagreement  between
cultures  and  schools  of  thought  on  these  issues  is  hard  to  reconcile.  For
centuries,  philosophers  have  tackled  the  question  of  identity.  But  the  joint
effect  of  technological  advances  and  market  forces  renders  people  into
“data  subjects”  whose  “digital  identities”  are  traded  and  used  (potentially
without  their  knowledge  and  consent),  and  forces  age-­old  thought
experiments  to  confront  a  new  reality.  Moreover,  a  digitally  networked
society  without  borders  urges  us  to  find  global  consensus  on  these  issues  as
it  becomes  much  harder  to  preserve  islands  of  idiosyncrasies.
Researchers  in  the  information  systems  community,  in  legal  studies,  in
philosophy,  in  marketing,  and  in  decision  sciences  have  focused  their
efforts  on  what  privacy  is  (Solove   2005 ;;  Iachello  and  Hong  2007 )  and
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how  it  can  be  measured  (Smith  et  al.   1996 ;;  Hong  and  Thong  2013 ).  User
experiments  have  investigated  why  and  under  what  circumstances  people
self-­disclose  (Dinev  and  Hart   2006 ;;  Berendt  et  al.   2005 ;;  Acquisti  and
Grossklags   2005 )  and  what  decision-­theoretical  pitfalls  people  regularly
fall  victim  to  when  it  comes  to  take  privacy  decisions  (John  et  al.   2011 ).
Based  on  such  insights,  measures  to  “nudge”  people  into  what  is
considered  more  rational  privacy  behavior  have  been  investigated
(Acquisti   2009 ).  The  common  social  research  perspective  to  protect
privacy  is  underlined  by  Daniel  Solove’s  ( 2005 )  overview  of  the  privacy
construct.  Solove’s  legal  analysis  of  what  Western  cultures  consider  to  be
“privacy”  reveals  that  the  commercial  data  handling  practices  now
promoted  by  personal  data  market  proponents  seem  to  completely
undermine  or  even  dissolve  this  value.  Common  market  practices,  such  as
the  aggregation  of  personal  data,  identification,  secondary  use,  exclusion,
and  decisional  interference  are  all  recognized  privacy  breaches  according
to  Solove’s  taxonomy.  This  seems  to  be  a  dilemma  in  which  personal  data
markets  operate  for  now.
Embracing  market-­based  frameworks,  some  early  research  has  started  to
look  into  stock  market  reactions  to  personal  data  breaches  (Acquisti  et  al.
2006 )  as  well  as  pay-­for-­privacy  schemes  (Jentzsch  et  al.   2012 ).
Microeconomic  modeling  and  reflections  on  personal  data’s  role  in
markets  have  been  provided  (Hui  and  Png  2006 ).  A  few  insights  exist  into
how  people  value  their  personal  data  (Spiekermann  et  al.   2012 ;;  Huberman
et  al.   2005 ;;  Danezis  et  al.   2005 ;;  Hann  et  al.   2007 ;;  Hui  et  al.   2007 ;;
Grossklags  and  Acquisti   2007 ;;  Acquisti  et  al.   2013 ).  But  can  personal
data  really  evolve  to  become  an  asset  for  people?  Can  people  develop  a
psychology  of  ownership  for  their  data  in  the  same  way  as  they  do  for
tangible  assets?  Will  people  not  want  to  continue  freely  communicate
online,  chat,  talk,  post  and  provide  their  data?  Pricing  psychology  for  the
intangible  data  asset  is  an  open  research  field.  At  the  same  time,  people  are
heterogeneous  in  terms  of  privacy  preferences  and  hence  their  potential
participation  in  markets  for  personal  information  (Berendt  et  al.   2005 ;;
Awad  and  Krishnan  2006 ;;  Norberg  et  al.   2007 ).  The  question  is  therefore
whether  the  desire  to  stay  private  may  disadvantage  some  people  in
personal  data  markets  more  than  others.  And  if  we  assume  that  individuals
trade  personal  data,  what  kind  of  controls  and  guarantees  do  they  want  and
need  to  trust  in  the  market  they  participate  in?
20.4.2015 e.Proofing
http://eproofing.springer.com/journals/printpage.php?token=hhy8suqZZz4fePqFqhWi6HvoXQCS-GQZpOPazC5DflE 11/19
A final outlook on personal data markets
The  phenomenon  of  personal  data  markets  is  gaining  momentum.  It  is
strongly  promoted  by  industry  players  that  benefit  from  trade  in  personal
information.  These  are  not  necessarily  traditional  companies  in  electronic
markets  investing  in  customer  relationships  and  directly  offering  valued
products  and  services  to  consumers.  Instead  these  “first  parties”  have  in
recent  years  given  up  an  important  part  of  the  data  market  to  “third  parties”
who  collect,  aggregate,  infer,  resell  and  package  users’  data.  Mostly,  we
would  argue,  doing  so  without  any  ordinary  user  expecting  that  this  is
happening.
The  problem  we  see  is  that  most  users  today  only  know  about  and
(sometimes)  trust  those  ‘first  parties’  they  see  and  interact  with.  If  they
learned  about  today’s  volume  and  business  done  with  their  data  among
third  parties,  they  may  be  surprised  and  feel  betrayed.  No  matter  whether
and  to  what  extent  first  party  companies  have  engaged  in  data  deals
themselves,  they  could  all  be  hit  by  a  backlash  from  users  once  they  find
out.  A  general  air  of  mistrust  would  be  the  result  in  which  data-­intensive
industries  will  have  difficulties  to  innovate  and  would  need  to  heavily
invest  into  regaining  trust.
Many  recent  studies  (including  the  study  contributed  by  BCG  staff  in  this
special  issue)  show  that  people  only  accept  active  data  sharing  where  they
are  consciously  involved  in  the  data  exchange.  They  don’t  appreciate
passive  data  collection.  Third-­party  use  of  data  is  seen  rather  negatively,  in
an  identified  as  well  as  anonymous  form.  What  seems  acceptable  to
consumers  are  situations  where  the  companies  they  deal  with  process  their
data  for  the  respective  service  relationship  and  guard  contextual  integrity.
When  these  first  parties  want  to  use  the  data  further  they  need  to  offer
customers  appropriate  returns.  But  they  cannot  expect  that  everyone  will
agree  to  such  secondary  uses  and  hence  they  need  to  give  their  customers  a
true  choice  over  participation  (Roeber  et  al.   2015 ).
Our  position—against  this  background—is  that  companies,  which  hold
customer  relationships  should  go  back  to  more  trustworthy  relationships
with  their  customers.  This  implies  that  they  need  to  respect  peoples’  data
protection  expectations  and  consider  much  more  carefully  how  they  engage
with  third  parties.  First  parties  should  not  rely  on  ‘data-­deals’  too  much,
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but  compete  on  service  and  product  quality.  They  should  give  customers
the  option  to  pay  for  online  services  that  are  fully  privacy  preserving  and
only  allow  for  data  sharing  with  third  parties  if  customers  allow  this  to
happen  and  get  a  fair  share  of  the  deal  in  a  transparent  way.  If  it  is
impractical  to  explicitly  spell  out  future  sharing  of  data  with  third  parties
and  secondary  use,  they  should  communicate  the  situation  transparently
with  consumers  and  let  the  “price”  of  such  sharing/use  to  emerge  through
an  efficient  pricing  mechanism  in  the  market.  Where  data  is  shared  and
used,  it  should  be  ensured  that  the  terms  of  the  deal  agreed  on  with  the  data
subjects  are  technically  and  legally  respected  (see,  e.g.,  a  technical
proposal  for  this  by  researchers  from  Microsoft  in  this  special  issue:
Maguire  et  al.   2015 ).
We  believe  that  if  companies  move  into  this  kind  of  transparent  business
scenario  many  legal  challenges  could  be  avoided  and  economic,  technical
and  social  challenges  could  fall  into  place  over  time.
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